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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993.1 In passing
this legislation, Congress attempted to require States that place a burden on an
individual or group’s “free exercise” of religion to show a compelling State interest
for doing so.2 The constitutional authorities that Congress relied on in enacting this
legislation were sections one and five of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 In 1997, the
Supreme Court ruled that the RFRA was an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to
use section five of the Fourteenth Amendment to “control cases and controversies.”4
Now, despite the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the RFRA, Congress is once
again trying to protect religion. On July 15, 1999, the House of Representatives
passed the Religious Liberty Protection Act (RLPA) by a 306-118 vote.5 The RLPA
has stalled in the Senate, as potential problems with the Bill continue to be debated.
The RLPA would require courts to overturn federal, state, and local laws which
unduly burden the exercise of religion, unless the government could show a
“compelling state interest” for the law, and that the law is the “least restrictive
means” of promoting that interest.6 Unlike the RFRA, which was premised on the
Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Clause, the RLPA is premised on Congress’
commerce and spending powers.7
Although the Religious Liberty Protection Act appears, on its face, to be simple,
there are many constitutional issues which call into question the validity of the
proposed bill. This note will focus on the constitutional problems of using Congress’
commerce and spending powers to protect religion. It will examine the problem of
attaching religious conditions to the States’ receipt of federal funds, and the potential
problem that may result from using the spending power to protect religious exercise.
1

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (1993).

2

Id.

3

Section 1 of the amendment states: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 5 of the
amendment gives Congress the power to “enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
[that] article.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
4

See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that the RFRA exceeded
Congress’ § 5 enforcement powers).
5

Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1999).

6

Id.

7

Id.
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The note then turns to the commerce clause justification for the RLPA. It will point
out the major flaw in using the commerce clause to protect religious exercise,
namely, that religions with little or no commercial component will not be protected
by the RLPA. It will also look at the problem of reconciling the RLPA and the
Establishment Clause, which prohibits Congress from passing laws “respecting
religion.”8 The note will examine a key case in the Establishment Clause area,
Larson v. Valente.9 It will point out that by protecting those religions that affect
commerce, and not those that do not, the RLPA is, in effect, a law respecting the
establishment of religion. The note will then turn to the effect that the RLPA will
have on civil rights laws, and the possible unintended consequences of the RLPA.
Finally, this note will consider the RLPA’s predecessor, the RFRA, as it relates to
Congress’ power to enforce constitutional rights under section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment.10
II. THE BILL: H.R. 1691- THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY PROTECTION ACT
A. The Language of the Proposed Law
Section 2(a) of the RLPA provides a general rule which reads as follows:
A government shall not substantially burden a person’s religious exercise:
(1) in a program or activity, operated by a government, that receives
Federal financial assistance; or (2) in any case in which the substantial
burden on the person’s religious exercise affects, or in which a removal of
that substantial burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations,
among the several States, or with Indian tribes; even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability.11
B. The Two Exceptions Wherein a Government May Burden Religious Exercise
Section 2(b) of the RLPA lists the exceptions to the general rule set out in
Section 2(a). The exceptions apply to instances when a government may
substantially burden a person’s religious exercise.12 Section 2(b) makes allowances
for the government to substantially burden a person’s religious exercise if the
government can demonstrate that application of the burden to the person: “(1) is in
furtherance of a compelling government interest; and (2) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”13

8

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

9

456 U.S. 228 (1991).

10

See supra note 3.

11

Religious Liberty Protection Act, H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. § 2(a) (1999).

12

Id. at § 2(b).

13

Id.
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS UPON WHICH THE RLPA IS PREMISED
A. The Religious Liberty Protection Act as an Exercise of Congress’
Spending Power
Section 2(a) of the RLPA makes the provisions of the Bill applicable to any
program or activity, operated by a government, that receives Federal financial
assistance.14 The RLPA defines a “program or activity” by using the same definition
of the term as used in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.15 It has been held by at least one
court that actual receipt of federal funds by a particular program or activity is not the
test of being subject to the conditions attached to those funds; the test, rather, is
whether the program or activity is part of the operations of a State or local
government that has received federal financial assistance.16 In other words, the
program or activity need not itself have received federal financial assistance to be
bound by the federal “free exercise” condition of the RLPA, but need only be part of
the operations of a government that has received federal funds in any capacity.17
Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution states: “The Congress shall have
Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States;. . .”18
The Supreme Court has held that Congress’ power to “provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States” allows Congress the power to
“authorize expenditure of public monies for public purposes [which] is not limited
by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.”19 The Court
went on to say, however, that while Congress’ spending power is not limited to
express grants of power found in the Constitution, it may not use its spending power
to usurp State powers reserved by the Tenth Amendment.20 Incident to Congress’
spending power is its power to attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds.21
Congress has used this power “to further broad policy objectives by conditioning
14

Id. at § 2(a)(1).

15

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states: “For the purposes of this subchapter, the
term “program or activity” and the term “program” meal all of the operations of—(1)(A) a
department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or of a local
government; or (B) the entity of such State or local government that distributes such
department or agency (and each other State or local government entity) to which the assistance
is extended, in the case of assistance to a State or local government; (2)(A) a college,
university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of higher education; or (B) a
local educational agency (as defined in section 198(a)(10) of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965), system of vocational education or other school system; . . . any part of
which is extended federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a (1964).
16

See Hodges by Hodges v. Public Bldg. Comm’n, 864 F. Supp. 1493 (N.D. Ill. 1994).

17

For a more detailed discussion see Kristian D. Whitten, Conditional Federal Spending
and the States’ “Free Exercise” of the Tenth Amendment, 21 CAMPBELL L. REV. 5 (1998).
18

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.

19

Whitten, supra note 17, at 14 (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1935)).

20

Id.

21

See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).
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receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with federal statutory
and administrative directives.”22
In 1987, the Supreme Court decided a key case on conditional federal spending
in South Dakota v. Dole.23 In Dole, the Court held that a federal statute conditioning
states’ receipt of a portion of federal highway funds on the states’ adoption of a
minimum drinking age of twenty-one was a valid exercise of Congress’ spending
power.24 In so holding, the Court discussed the general restrictions on Congress’
spending power, as articulated in various earlier Supreme Court cases.25 The first of
these restrictions is that the exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of the
“general welfare.”26 The Court noted that in considering whether a particular
expenditure is intended to serve the general welfare, courts should defer greatly to
the judgment of Congress.27 The second restriction on Congress’ spending power as
noted in Dole is that if Congress wishes to condition the States’ receipt of federal
funds, it “must do so unambiguously…, enabl[ing] the States to exercise their choice
knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.”28 The third
restriction on the spending power is that conditions on federal grants might be
illegitimate if they are unrelated “to the federal interest in particular national projects
or programs.”29 Finally, other constitutional provisions may provide an independent
bar to the conditional grant of federal funds.30
The Dole Court found that the first three limitations did not apply to the federal
statute at hand.31 The Court concluded that the provision was designed to serve the
general welfare, the conditions upon which the States were to receive funds were
clearly stated by Congress, and that the condition was germane to the federal
purposes.32 In assessing the fourth restriction on the spending power, the Court in
Dole found that the independent constitutional bar limitation on the federal spending
power is not “a prohibition on the indirect achievement of objectives which Congress
is not empowered to achieve directly.”33 The Court found, instead, that the language
of their earlier opinions “stands for the unexceptional proposition that the power may
not be used to induce the States to engage in activities that would themselves be
22

Id. (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980)).

23

483 U.S. 203 (1987).

24

Id. at 212.

25

Id. at 207.

26

Id. (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937)).

27

Id.

28

483 U.S. 207 (quoting Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1,17
(1981)).
29

Id. (citing Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)).

30

Id. (citing Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269-70
(1985)).
31

483 U.S. at 208.

32

Id.

33

Id. at 210.
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unconstitutional.”34 The Court went on to note that “in some circumstances the
financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at
which ‘pressure turns into compulsion’.”35 Because the financial inducement at issue
in the Dole case was a mere 5% of South Dakota’s federal highway funds, the Court
found it to be only a mild encouragement to the states.36 The Court found that the
threat of losing such a small portion of highway funds if South Dakota did not
comply with the twenty-one drinking age did not amount to Congress regulating
“those purposes which are within the exclusive province of the states.”37
The spending power reliance in the Religious Liberty Protection Act is sure to
cause problems. Constitutional scholars have already noted that the only way for
state and local governments to avoid the RLPA’s mandate would be to forgo all
federal financial assistance.38 The RLPA is Congress’ attempt to regulate an area
reserved to the states. The First Amendment to the Constitution states: “Congress
shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion…”39 This clause of the
First Amendment, known as the Establishment Clause, is a limitation on Congress’
power, and not a delegation of power. The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution
reserves all powers not delegated to the United States to the States or to the people.40
In the RLPA, Congress is attempting to regulate an area, namely religion, that is
reserved to the states. Forcing states to either accept RLPA’s mandate, or refuse all
federal financial assistance, “runs afoul of the Tenth Amendment.”41
Under South Dakota v. Dole, when “the financial inducement offered by
Congress [is] so coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into
compulsion” there is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ spending power.42
The Religious Liberty Protection Act is about as coercive as legislation can get.
State and local governments can either take federal funds with the RLPA liability, or
take no funds at all.43 Under South Dakota v. Dole, this Act is an unconstitutional
use of Congress’ spending power.
The RLPA is also contrary to other restrictions on Congress’ spending power as
articulated in Dole. Although the Act was likely intended to serve the general
34

Id.

35

Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).

36

483 U.S. at 211.

37

Whitten, supra note 17, at 19-20.

38
See, e.g., Kristian D. Whitten, Cracks in the Church Wall: Religious Liberty Protection
Act Would Violate Establishment Clause, LEGAL TIMES, July 26, 1999, at 17.
39

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

40

Amendment 10 reads: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X.
41

Whitten, supra note 38.

42

Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.

43

Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Marci A.
Hamilton, Yeshiva University, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law).
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purposes, it does not unambiguously condition the States receipt of federal funds, as
is required.44 The RLPA states that “[A] government shall not substantially burden a
person’s religious exercise in a program or activity, operated by a government, that
receives Federal financial assistance.”45 This rather unclearly mandates that
governments comply with the RLPA, or, should they choose not to comply, must
refuse all federal funds or be subject to the liabilities of the RLPA.
The RLPA can also be seen as violating another restriction on Congress’
spending power as set forth in South Dakota v. Dole: there must be a connection
between the spending and the condition attached to the spending.46 Dole clearly
states that conditions on federal funds may be illegitimate if they are unrelated “to
the federal interest in particular national projects or programs.”47 RLPA applies to
all programs or activities that receive federal financial assistance.48 This may apply
to anything from federally funded clinics and hospitals to single mothers receiving
federal welfare checks. The relationship between these types of federal funds and
the conditions mandated in the RLPA is tenuous at best.
B. The Religious Liberty Protection Act as an Exercise Of Congress’ Commerce
Clause Power
In addition to the problems posed by the RLPA’s spending power reliance, there
are problems raised by the Bill’s reliance on the commerce clause. Section 2(a)(2) of
the RLPA prohibits governments from substantially burdening a person’s religious
exercise “in any case in which the substantial burden on the person’s religious
exercise affects, or in which a removal of that substantial burden would affect,
commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes; even
if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.”49 Scholars fear that the
Bill’s reliance on Congress’ commerce power50 will offer no protection to religious
free exercise that has little or no commercial component.51 Furthermore, there will
be many cases in which the effect on commerce cannot be proven, and will therefore
not be protected by the RLPA.52

44

Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.

45

Religious Liberty Protection Act at § 2(a)(1).

46

Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.

47

Id.

48

Religious Liberty Protection Act at § 2(a)(1).

49

Id. at § 2(a)(2).

50

The Commerce Clause gives the Congress the power to “regulate commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3.
51

See Whitten, supra note 38.

52

Id.
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Because RLPA is not limited to activities that substantially affect commerce, it
can be seen as exceeding Congress’ power under the commerce clause.53 Under U.S.
v. Lopez, courts must ask whether a law regulates activities that “substantially affect”
interstate commerce.54 The Court in Lopez also held that courts must consider the
“inherent limits of federalism on the exercise of the commerce clause.”55
Furthermore, Congress cannot use the commerce clause power in a way that would
“convert congressional authority under the commerce clause to a general police
power of the sort retained by the States.”56
IV. THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY PROTECTION ACT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE PROBLEM
A. The First Amendment Prohibition on Laws “Respecting Religion”
Although the RLPA is premised on Congress’ commerce and spending powers,
some constitutional experts believe that neither justification is sufficient to overcome
the First Amendment, which prohibits Congress from enacting laws “respecting an
establishment of religion.”57 Much like its predecessor, the RFRA, the RLPA
attempts to define the scope of religious free exercise protected by the First
Amendment, thus violating the Establishment Clause. The RLPA may be viewed as
a law that does, in fact, respect religion. Looking, for example, at the commerce
clause justification for the RLPA, it would appear that the RLPA is a law respecting
religion. The RLPA protects religions that affect commerce, but not religions that do
not affect commerce.58 This is, in effect, a law “respecting an establishment of
religion,” and is, therefore, in violation of the First Amendment Establishment
Clause.59 The Supreme Court has held that “the clearest command of the
Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially
preferred over another.”60 By protecting those religions that affect interstate
commerce, and not protecting religions that do not affect interstate commerce, the
RLPA is clearly preferring one religion over another, in direct violation of the
Supreme Court’s holding.61

53

Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Marci A.
Hamilton, Yeshiva University, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law).
54

514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).

55

Id. at 566.

56

Id. at 567.

57

See Whitten, supra note 38 (quoting, U.S. CONST. amend. I).

58

Religious Liberty Protection Act at § 2(a)(2).

59

See Whitten, supra note 38.

60

Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1981).

61

See Whitten, supra note 38.
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B. Larson v. Valente
At issue in Larson v. Valente was the constitutionality of a Minnesota statute that
imposed certain registration and reporting requirements upon only those religious
organizations that solicited greater than fifty percent of their funds from
nonmembers.62 The statute at issue, the Minnesota Charitable Solicitation Act63 was
designed to protect the public from contributing to fraudulent charities, and required
charities to register and disclose the contributions they received with the Minnesota
Department of Commerce.64 From the time the Act was passed in 1961, until 1978,
all “religious organizations” were exempted from the provisions of the Act.65 Then,
in 1978, the Minnesota Legislature amended the Act to include a “fifty percent
rule.”66 The rule required that only those religious organizations that received more
than fifty percent of their total contributions from members or affiliated
organizations would remain exempt from the registration and reporting requirements
of the Act.67 Those religious organizations that received fifty percent or less of their
contributions from members or affiliated organizations would be subject to the
registration and reporting requirements.68
Appellee Valente, a member of the Unification Church, brought suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota seeking a declaration that
the Act, on its face and as applied to the Unification Church through the so-called
“fifty-percent rule” constituted an abridgment of their First Amendment rights of
expression and free exercise of religion, as well as a denial of their right to equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.69 Valente also
argued that the fifty-percent rule discriminated among religious organizations, and
thus violated the Establishment Clause.70 The District Court found the Act to be
facially unconstitutional with respect to religious organizations, and was therefore
entirely void as to such organizations.71 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s holding that the fifty-percent rule
violated the Establishment Clause.72 The Supreme Court then granted certiorari.
In finding for Valente, the Supreme Court held that the fifty-percent rule of the
statute clearly granted denominational preferences, and thus declared the statute
invalid.73 The Court found that the effect of the fifty-percent rule was to impose the
62

Larson, 456 U.S. at 230.

63

MINN. STAT. §§ 309.50-309.61 (1969).

64

Larson, 456 U.S. at 231.

65

Id.

66

Id.

67

Id. at 232.

68

Id.

69

Id. at 233.

70

Larson, 456 U.S. at 234.

71

Id. at 235.

72

Id. at 237.

73

Id. at 246.
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registration and reporting requirements of the Act on some religious organizations,
but not on others.74 The Court noted that had the provisions of the Act been designed
to operate evenly, on all religions, the registration and reporting requirements would
have been permissible.75 However, the fifty-percent rule was, in the Court’s words,
“the selective legislative imposition of burdens and advantages upon particular
denominations.”76 The Court found that the fifty-percent rule was designed with “the
explicit intention of including particular religious denominations and excluding
others.”77 The Court found that the fifty-percent rule in the Act set up the precise
type of official denominational preference that the Framer’s of the Constitution
forbade.78 The Court also stated that the constitutional prohibition of denominational
preferences is “inextricably connected with the continuing vitality of the Free
Exercise Clause.”79 The Court went on to say that equality of all religions would be
impossible in the face of official denominational preferences, such as the one at issue
in Minnesota’s fifty-percent rule.80
As the Supreme Court noted in Larson v. Valente, the “clearest command of the
Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially
preferred over another.”81 The RLPA allows for an official preference of one
religious group over another; namely, the preference of those religions that “affect,
commerce” over those religions that do not.82 The RLPA, therefore, is clearly in
violation of the Establishment Clause.
C. Employment Division v. Smith
In Employment Division v. Smith, respondents Smith and Black were fired by a
private drug rehabilitation organization for ingesting peyote, a hallucinogenic drug,
for religious purposes during a ceremony of their Native American Church.83
Respondents were then denied unemployment compensation by the State of Oregon
under a state law which disqualified employees discharged for misconduct.84

74

Id. at 253.

75

Id.

76

Larson, 456 U.S. at 254.

77

Id.

78

Id. at 255.

79

Id. at 245.

80

Id.

81

Larson, 456 U.S. at 244.

82

Religious Liberty Protection Act at § 2(a)(2).

83

494 U.S. 872 (1990).

84

Id. Oregon law prohibited the knowing or intentional possession of a “controlled
substance” unless prescribed by a medical doctor. OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4) (1987).
“Controlled substance” was defined to include drugs classified in Schedules I through V of the
Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 811-812. Peyote was included in the
Schedule I classification, and possession constituted a Class B felony under Oregon law. OR.
REV. STAT. § 475.992(4)(a) (1987).
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Respondents claimed a religious exemption from the Oregon law,85 charging that the
law prohibited their free exercise of religion.86 The Oregon Supreme Court held that
the Oregon statute made no exception for the sacramental use of peyote, and that
Smith and Black’s religious use of the drug was within the prohibition of the
statute.87 However, the Court went on to find that the prohibition was invalid under
the Free Exercise Clause, and that the State could not deny employment benefits to
respondents for having used peyote for a religious purpose.88 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to examine the issue of whether the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment permits Oregon to include religiously used peyote in its prohibition
of use of that drug, and thus permits the State to deny unemployment benefits to
persons dismissed from their jobs because of such use of peyote.89
In its opinion, the Supreme Court first looked at the history and background of
the Free Exercise Clause. The Court noted that the free exercise of religion means
the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.90 This right
of free exercise, the Court stated, includes not only the right to believe and profess
one’s religious doctrine, but also the right to perform (or abstain from performing)
physical acts based upon those beliefs.91 The Court found that it would be
unconstitutional for a State to ban such acts or abstentions only when engaged in for
religious reasons, but not when engaged in for non-religious reasons.92
The Court then went on to differentiate the above examples from the case at bar.
The respondents in Smith contended that their religious motivation in using peyote
placed them beyond the reach of the criminal law, even though the law was not
specifically directed at their religious practice, and the law was constitutional as
applied toward those who use the drug for other reasons.93 Respondents further
argued that “prohibiting the free exercise of religion” included requiring any

85

The First Amendment prohibition on laws establishing religion was incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), making that
amendment applicable to the states. The Court in Cantwell held that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process clause incorporated the section of the First Amendment that reads,
“Congress shall make no law respecting . . . the free exercise [of religion]. Id. at 303.
86

Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 872.

87

Id. at 876.

88

Id.

89

Id. at 874.

90

Id. at 877.

91

Id. The Court here noted certain types of physical acts that would constitute religious
free exercise. They include, among others, assembling for worship, participating in
sacramental use of bread and wine, or abstaining from eating certain foods.
92

Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 877. The Court cited instances when action would be
unconstitutional in this regard. For example, if a state passed a law that banned the casting of
statues only when the statue was to be used for worship purposes, the law would be
unconstitutional.
93

Id. at 878.
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individual to observe a generally applicable law that requires(or forbids) the
performance of an act that his religious belief forbids (or requires).94
In finding for petitioner, the Court held that because respondents’ ingestion of
peyote was prohibited under Oregon law, and because that prohibition was
constitutional, the State could, consistent with the Free Exercise Clause, deny the
respondents unemployment compensation when they were dismissed due to the use
of the drug.95 In so holding, the Court examined their precedents, and found that no
case had ever held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance
with an otherwise valid law that prohibits conduct the State is allowed to regulate.96
The Court looked at a line of cases which held that the right of free exercise does not
relieve an individual from an obligation to comply with valid laws of general
applicability.97 The first such case that the Court looked at was Reynolds v. United
States.98 In that case, the Court rejected the claim that criminal laws against
polygamy could not be constitutionally applied to individuals whose religion
required the practice.99
The next case the Court looked at was Prince v. Massachusetts,100 wherein the
Court held that a mother could be prosecuted under child labor laws for using her
children to dispense literature in the streets, regardless of her religious motivation.101
Another case the Court looked at was Braunfeld v. Brown,102 in which a Sundayclosing law was upheld against the claim that it burdened the religious practices of
persons whose religions compelled them to refrain from working on other days of the
week.103 The final precedent that the Court looked at was Gillette v. United States,104
under which the Supreme Court sustained the military Selective Service System

94

Id.

95

Id. at 890.

96

Id. at 879. The Court noted a succinct description of this notion by Justice Frankfurter in
Minersville School Dist. Bd. Of Ed. V. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95 (1940):
Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious
toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the
promotion or restriction of religious beliefs. The mere possession of religious
convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not
relieve the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilites.
97

Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 879.

98

98 U.S. 145 (1879).

99

Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 879 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1879)).
100

321 U.S. 158 (1944).

101

Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 880 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
171 (1944)).
102

366 U.S. 599 (1961).

103

Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 880 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599
(1961)).
104

401 U.S. 437 (1971).
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against the claim that it violated free exercise by compulsorily enrolling persons who
opposed a particular war on religious grounds.105
The Court found that the crux of respondents’ argument, that when otherwise
prohibited conduct is coupled with religious convictions, the conduct must be free
from governmental regulation, went against all prior Court decisions, as laid out in
the previously set forth holdings.106 Because the Court found there to be no
contention that the Oregon drug law was an attempt to regulate religious beliefs, the
rule to which the Court had adhered ever since Reynolds applied, namely, that
religious practices may be interfered with if the interference results from a valid law
of general applicability, not designed to target religious beliefs or practices
directly.107 Respondents argued that although an exemption from generally
applicable criminal laws need not be automatically given to religiously motivated
individuals, the claim for a religious exemption must be evaluated by the courts
under the balancing test set forth by the Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner.108 The
Sherbert court adopted a balancing test which required states to show a “compelling
state interest” to justify burdening an individual’s religion.109 The Court in
Employment Division v. Smith, however, abandoned the Sherbert test, holding that
generally applicable state laws may be applied to religious practices even when not
supported by a compelling state interest.110 Furthermore, the Court found that
although states may allow for a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption for
otherwise illegal activities (such as ingesting peyote), this exemption is not
constitutionally required.111
The RLPA cannot be seen as a religious-practice exemption, as permitted by
Employment Division v. Smith. Instead, it is a realignment of power between church
and state; it forces a state to make accommodations for religion even if the state
determines that such an accommodation goes against the general welfare.112 The
RLPA grants privileges to religion over all other interests.113 Congress lacks the
power to privilege religion in such a way.114 Although the Supreme Court noted in
105
Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 880 (citing Gillette v. United State, 401 U.S. 437,
461 (1971)).
106

Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 882.

107

Id.

108

Id. at 883 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).

109

Id.

110

Id. at 882. The Court found that “To make an individual’s obligation to obey such a
law contingent upon the law’s coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the state’s
interest is ‘compelling’- permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, ‘to become a law unto
himself,’ contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense.” Id. at 885 (citing
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 145).
111

Id. at 890.

112

Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Marci A.
Hamilton, Yeshiva University, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law).
113

Id. at 371.

114

See id.
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Smith that certain nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemptions may be
permissible, it has not given any indication that legislatures have the power to
privilege religion in such an across-the-board manner as done in the RLPA.115 The
RLPA is not a permissible accommodation, but rather an unconstitutional
establishment of religion.116
V. THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY PROTECTION ACT AND CIVIL RIGHTS
A. Claims Under the Religious Liberty Protection Act May Be Used to
Defeat Civil Rights
The RLPA would provide federal statutory protection for religious exercise to
replace or increase the constitutional protection which was available before the
Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith lowered the standard of
review for free exercise claims.117 The RLPA requires that a state or local
government shall not substantially burden a person’s religious exercise unless the
government demonstrates a compelling governmental interest for doing so, and that
the burden is the least restrictive means for furthering that compelling governmental
interest.118 The RLPA does not have a provision which specifically addresses its
potential effect on state and local civil rights laws.119 Many experts worry that an
unintended consequence of the RLPA will be the use of religious free exercise as a
defense to civil rights claims.120
One area protected by civil rights laws, marital status, is sure to face an RLPA
religious exercise defense. Many landlords claim that their religious beliefs about
premarital sex requires them to deny housing to unmarried couples, despite state or
local fair housing laws which forbid discrimination based on marital status for
housing.121 The RLPA will allow landlords to use a religious exercise defense in

115

Id.

116

Id.

117

494 U.S. 872 (1990).

118

Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 1691, 106th Cong.

119

During the subcommittee discussion on the Religious Liberty Protection Act in the
105th Congress, Congressman Robert C. Scott offered an amendment to ensure that the RLPA
would not create any defense to civil rights claims. The amendment stated that “[n]othing in
this Act shall be construed to provide a defense to any other civil or criminal action based on
any Federal, State, or local civil rights law.” The amendment was rejected by the
subcommittee, and is not part of the RLPA as it is now written.
120
See, e.g., Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999)
(statement of Christopher E. Anders, Legislative Counsel to the American Civil Liberties
Union). In his testimony, Mr. Anders stated, “Our concern [the ACLU] is that some courts
turn a federal statutory shield for religious exercise into a sword against state and local civil
rights laws.”
121
Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of
Christopher E. Anders, Legislative Counsel to the American Civil Liberties Union).
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denying housing to unmarried couples, in violation of fair housing laws.122 When
using standards of review similar to the “compelling governmental interest” standard
set forth in the RLPA, several courts have recently ruled on cases whereby a
defendant in a civil rights action defended on the grounds of religious liberty.123
Defendants in civil rights cases have also used a religious liberty defense in cases
involving race or sexual orientation. The World Church of the Creator, for example,
claims a religious belief in promoting the white race.124 Gay lawyers say the RLPA
will allow conservative Christian landlords to refuse to rent to gays and lesbians,
despite state laws protecting homosexuals from housing discrimination.125 In
Thomas v. Municipality of Anchorage, a landlord of a building in which he was not a
resident successfully argued that the application of strict scrutiny to the fair housing
laws would permit him to discriminate against unmarried couples seeking rental.126
Using the same reasoning, the RLPA may allow conservative Christians and other
religious people may be allowed to discriminate against homosexuals in housing and
employment by claiming a religious belief in doing so.127
B. Application of the Four-Part RLPA Test to Civil Rights Claims
The Religious Liberty Protection Act states that:
A [state or local] government shall not substantially burden a person’s
religious exercise in a program or activity, operated by a government, that
receives federal financial assistance [or impose a substantial burden on
religious exercise if the burden affects interstate commerce], even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability. . . [unless the]
government demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1)
is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.128
Therefore, in deciding cases which involves a religious free exercise defense to a
civil rights claim, courts under the RLPA must apply a four-part test. First, is the
defendant’s discrimination a “religious exercise”?129 Second, does the applicable
state or local anti-discrimination law “substantially burden” the defendant’s religious

122

Id.

123

See, e.g., Thomas v. Municipality of Anchorage, 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding
that the governmental interest in preventing marital status discrimination was not compelling).
124

John Cloud, Law on Bended Knee, TIME, Sept. 13, 1999, at 32.

125

Id.

126

165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1999).

127

Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Marci A.
Hamilton, Yeshiva University, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law).
128

Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 1691, 106th Cong.

129

Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of
Christopher E. Anders, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union).
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exercise?130 Third, is the government’s interest in eradicating the discrimination
“compelling”?131 Finally, are uniformly applied anti-discrimination laws the least
restrictive means of furthering any compelling governmental interest?132
1. Is Discrimination “Religious Exercise” Under RLPA?
Using the Language of the Religious Liberty Protection Act, the first part of the
test that courts must utilize is to ask whether a refusal to comply with civil rights
laws is religious exercise.133 The definition of “religious exercise” in the RLPA is
very broad, allowing any civil rights defendant who can show that his or her
discriminatory actions were “substantially motivated by religious belief” to meet the
first prong of the RLPA test.134 Using a similar standard to the one set forth in the
RLPA, courts have held that the refusal to rent an apartment to an unmarried couple
based on a landlord’s religious belief that premarital sex is sinful is religious
exercise.135 In the employment context, courts have held that hiring decisions can be
deemed religious exercise, if the employer can demonstrate that the decision was
based on religious belief or doctrine.136
2. Do State and Local Civil Rights Statutes “Substantially Burden” Religious
Exercise?
The second part of the RLPA test requires that in order for the RLPA protection
to be available, the state or local law must “substantially burden” an individual’s
religious exercise.137 The purpose for this part of the RLPA test is to avoid litigation
over laws which are neutral, or have only a small impact on religious exercise.138
Congress did not define “substantial burden” as it applies to the RLPA, and there is

130

Id.

131

Id.

132

Id.

133

Id.

134

The RLPA defines religious exercise as “an act or refusal to act that is substantially
motivated by religious belief, whether or not the religious exercise is compulsory or central to
a larger system of religious belief.” H.R. 1691 § 7(a)(3).
135

See Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm’n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996). This
case was decided when the RFRA, the RLPA’s predecessor was still good law. The court in
Smith stated that “while the renting of apartments may not constitute the exercise of religion, if
Smith claims the laws regulating that activity indirectly coerce her to violate her religious
beliefs, we cannot avoid testing her claim under the analysis codified in RFRA.” Id. at 923.
136
See EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding
that a retaliatory action taken by a religious publisher against employee who instituted EEOC
proceedings alleging sex discrimination was religious exercise because church doctrine
prohibited lawsuits by members against the church).
137

H.R. 1691 § 2(a).

138

Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of
Christopher E. Anders, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union).
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no generally applicable test to determine when a “substantial burden” exists.139
Circuit Courts, however, have adopted a broad reading of “substantial burden”
during the years when the RLPA’s predecessor, the RFRA, was in effect. In Mack v.
O’Leary, the Seventh Circuit held that:
A substantial burden on the free exercise of religion [within the meaning
of the RFRA] is one that forces adherents of a religion to refrain from
religiously motivated conduct, inhibits or constrains conduct or expression
that manifests a central tenet of a person’s religious beliefs, or compels
conduct or expression that is contrary to those beliefs.140
The Tenth Circuit has held that to exceed the “substantial burden” threshold,
governmental regulation must “significantly inhibit or constrain conduct or
expression that manifests some central tenet of a [person’s] individual beliefs.”141
The Eighth Circuit found that a substantial burden was imposed when a person is
compelled “by threat of sanctions, to refrain from religiously motivated conduct.”142
The California Supreme Court has held that compliance with state fair housing
laws does not constitute a substantial burden on religious free exercise. In Smith v.
Fair Employment & Housing Comm’n, a landlord argued that her religious beliefs
prevented her from renting apartments to unmarried couples.143 The court found that
because the landlord’s religious beliefs did not require her to rent apartments, but
merely to refrain from renting to unmarried couples, there was no substantial burden
on her religious free exercise.144 The court noted that if the landlord did not wish to
comply with the State’s housing anti-discrimination laws, that she had the
opportunity to sell her rental properties and put the capital in other investments.145
The court held that no religious exercise was burdened if the landlord followed the
alternative course of placing her capital in another investment.146
The Court in Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm’n used an analysis for
“substantial burden” that is a great deal stricter than the analysis required under the
RLPA. Under the RLPA, courts may view the choice of switching to another
occupation to avoid anti-discrimination laws as too harsh, and determine that the
burden is indeed substantial.147 Should courts determine that changing professions to
avoid fair housing laws constitutes a substantial burden to a landlord’s free exercise

139

Id.

140

80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996).

141

See Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1480 (10th Cir. 1995).

142

See Brown-El v. Harris, 26 F.3d 68, 70 (8th Cir. 1994).

143

913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996).

144

Id. at 925.

145

Id.

146

Id. at 926.

147

Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of
Christopher E. Anders, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union).
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of religion, the RLPA would allow the landlord to engage in discriminatory housing
practices if the practice was deemed a religious free exercise.148
3. Is the Governmental Interest in Eradicating Discrimination Compelling?
The third part of the RLPA test requires that a government must have a
compelling interest to justify the imposition of a substantial burden to an individual’s
religious exercise.149 Courts are sharply split on this part of the RLPA test when
deciding civil rights cases wherein a defendant has raised a religious liberty
defense.150 In most cases, the government’s interest in eradicating racial and sexbased discrimination has been found to meet the compelling interest standard.151
However, because newly protected classes such as sexual orientation, disability, and
marital status do not receive the same level of scrutiny as race and sex, it is more
difficult to persuade courts that the governmental interest in preventing
discrimination on such grounds is compelling.152 Courts are divided on whether or
not preventing discrimination against these groups is a compelling governmental
interest.153
Courts have also been reluctant to find a compelling governmental interest in
ending certain types of discrimination when other state or local laws discriminate
against the class. For example, laws forbidding fornication or sodomy have provided
support for the conclusion that there is no compelling governmental interest in
protecting against discrimination based on marital status or sexual orientation.154 In
Cooper v. French, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated, “How can there be a
compelling state interest in promoting fornication when there is a state statute

148

Id.

149

Religious Liberty Protection Act at § 2(b)(1).

150

Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of
Christopher E. Anders, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union).
151

See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (holding that the
government has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in
education); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (holding that the state
government’s compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against its female citizens
justifies the impact on the male members’ associational freedoms).
152
Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of
Christopher E. Anders, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union).
153

See, e.g., Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. App. 1987)
(holding that the District of Columbia’s interest in prohibiting educational institutions from
denying equal access to benefits on the basis of sexual orientation is compelling); Swanner v.
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1993) (holding that Anchorage’s
interest in prohibiting marital status discrimination in housing is compelling); But see Cooper
v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990) (holding that there was no compelling governmental
interest in ending discrimination against unmarried couples).
154
Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of
Christopher E. Anders, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union).
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prohibiting it?”155 Likewise, courts have found that a government interest in ending
discrimination based on marital status is not compelling in light of state and local
laws which favor married couples.156 In this way, the RLPA’s “compelling
governmental interest test” may make it more difficult for state and local
governments to attempt to eradicate certain types of discrimination.
4. Are Uniformly Applied Anti-Discrimination Laws the Least Restrictive Means
Available?
The final part of the Religious Liberty Protection Act’s test is whether the
challenged state or local law uses the least restrictive means to achieve the
government’s compelling interest.157 There has been general agreement among state
courts deciding this issue that uniform application of anti-discrimination laws is the
least restrictive means for a government to achieve its compelling interest.158 In
Minnesota ex. Rel. McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., for example, the owners
of a health club hired only employees whose religious beliefs were consistent with
the owners’ religious beliefs, even though state law prohibited employment
discrimination based on religion, sex, and marital status.159 The court found that “the
state’s overriding compelling interest of eradicating discrimination based upon sex,
race, marital status, or religion could be substantially frustrated if employers,
professing as deep and sincere religious beliefs as those held by appellants, could
discriminate against the protected classes.”160
Because civil rights laws normally contain certain exemptions for religious
organizations, proponents of RLPA will likely argue that the government cannot
have a compelling interest in the uniform application of civil rights laws.161 A less
restrictive means than the uniform application of civil rights laws may be available
under the Religious Liberty Protection Act: granting exemptions from civil rights
laws to individuals who hold sincere religious beliefs which forbid them from
155

460 N.W.2d 2, 10 (Minn. 1990).

156

See, e.g., Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990) (noting preferential treatment
of married couples in employee life and health insurance benefits).
157

Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of
Christopher E. Anders, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union).
158

See, e.g., Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 874 P.2d 274, 280 n.9 (Alaska
1993) (finding that “the most effective tool the state has for combating discrimination is to
prohibit discrimination; these laws do exactly that. Consequently, the means are narrowly
tailored and there is no less restrictive alternative.”); See also Gay Rights Coalition v.
Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 39 (D.C. App. 1987) (stating that “the District of Columbia’s
overriding interest in eradicating sexual orientation discrimination, if it is ever to be converted
from aspiration to reality, requires that Georgetown equally distribute tangible benefits to the
student groups.”).
159

370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985).

160

Id. at 853.

161

Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of
Christopher E. Anders, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000

19

408

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:389

obeying anti-discrimination laws.162 However, granting exemptions from civil rights
laws may increase the number of people claiming a religious defense for their
discriminatory actions.163 For this reason, uniform application of civil rights laws
may be the least restrictive means to accomplish the goals of anti-discrimination
laws.164
The American Civil Liberties Union, which helped draft the Religious Liberty
Protection Act, as well as the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, now opposes
the bill unless an amendment makes it clear that religious claims cannot be used to
defeat civil rights laws.165 The ACLU believes that unless Congress amends the
RLPA to respond to the potential civil rights problems, or develops an alternative
approach to addressing the problem of increasing protection for religious exercise
against neutral state and local laws, the RLPA may provide a new defense to state
and local civil rights claims made by persons who already receive the least protection
from the courts and the federal government.166 The official ACLU position on the
Religious Liberty Protection Act is that Congress should not pass the bill without
ensuring that it will not deprive persons of their civil rights under state and local
laws.167

162

Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of
Christopher E. Anders, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union).
163

Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of
Christopher E. Anders, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union).
164
See Minnesota ex rel. McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 853
n.16 (Minn. 1985) (stating that if the court permitted the exemption in this case, other
employees, “if they could demonstrate their beliefs were sincere and based on accepted
theological concepts, would be permitted to discriminate contrary to the state’s public policy
of affording equality of opportunity and equal access to public accommodation to all its
citizens. To permit such an exception would substantially emasculate the state’s public policy
of ensuring civil rights for citizens.”); Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 240
(Mass. 1994) (finding that “the practical problems of administering a law with the exemption
that the defendants seek may be shown to be such as to make the operation of such an
exemption impractical.”); See also Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, 556 F.2d 310, 323 (5th
Cir. 1977) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“[W]hen recognizing the [free exercise] claim will
predictably give rise to further claims, many of which undoubtedly will be fraudulent or
exaggerated, the situation is different. In that event the court must either recognize many such
claims . . . or draw fine and searching distinctions among the various free exercise claimants.
The latter course would raise serious constitutional questions with respect to the proper
functioning of the courts in sensitive religious clause adjudication.”).
165

John Cloud, Law on Bended Knee, TIME, Sept. 13, 1999, at 33.

166
Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of
Christopher E. Anders, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union).
167
Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of
Christopher E. Anders, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union).
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VI. THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY PROTECTION ACT AND CONGRESS’ POWER TO
ENFORCE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER SECTION FIVE OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment States:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.168
Section Five, which is the final provision of the Amendment, states, “The Congress
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article.”169
A. The Religious Liberty Protection Act’s Predecessor: The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act
In 1993, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act170 in direct
response to Employment Division v. Smith, which held that a state need not
demonstrate a “compelling interest” to justify laws of general application that
incidentally burden the free exercise of religion.171 The RFRA essentially overturned
Smith by requiring federal and state governments to meet the compelling interest test
when substantially burdening a person’s exercise of religion.172 The RFRA sought to
restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner,173 and to
guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially
burdened, and to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is
substantially burdened by governement.174 The RFRA passed with broad support,

168

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

169

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.

170

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994). The RFRA stated, in relevant part, that “(1) the framers of
the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an unalienable right, secured its
protection in the First Amendment to the Constitution; (2) laws ‘neutral’ toward religion may
burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise; (3)
governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without compelling
justification; (4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) the Supreme Court
virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise
imposed by laws neutral toward religion; (5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior
Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty
and competing prior governmental interests.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
171

494 U.S. 872, 884-85 (1990).

172

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b)-2(a) (1994).

173

374 U.S. 398 (1963).

174

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (1994).
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and was extremely popular.175 In enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
Congress relied on Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, and its power under
Section Five of that Amendment, to “enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provision of [that] article.”176
B. City of Boerne v. Flores
The case of City of Boerne v. Flores concerned the constitutionality of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act.177 The city of Boerne, Texas passed an
ordinance authorizing the city’s Historic Landmark Commission to set up an area of
proposed historic landmarks and districts.178 Under the ordinance, the Commission
had final approval of all construction affecting historic landmarks or buildings in a
historic district.179 Shortly after the city passed this ordinance, St. Peter’s Catholic
Church applied for a building permit to enlarge the church.180 Because the city’s
Historic Landmark Commission found St. Peter’s to be located in a historic district,
they denied the application.181 The Archbishop of the San Antonio Diocese then
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas
challenging the denial of the permit.182 In his claim, the Archbishop relied on the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act as one basis for relief from the city’s refusal to
issue the building permit.183 The District Court concluded that the RFRA exceeded
Congress’ power of enforcement under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment.184 The Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court, finding the RFRA to
be constitutional.185 The Supreme Court then granted certiorari.
In deciding City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court looked at the language
of the RFRA. It noted that the RFRA prohibited the government from substantially
burdening a person’s exercise of religion unless the government can demonstrate that
the burden “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”186 The
Court stated that in the RFRA, Congress relied on its Fourteenth Amendment
175
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enforcement power in enacting the most far reaching and substantial of RFRA’s
provisions, those which impose its requirements on the States.187 Because of the
disagreement over whether or not the RFRA was a proper exercise of Congress’
Section Five enforcement power, the Court next analyzed in detail this portion of the
respondent’s argument.
The respondents in City of Boerne v. Flores argued that the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act was a permissible enforcement legislation.188 They contended that
Congress, through the RFRA, was only protecting by legislation one of the liberties
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the free exercise of
religion, beyond what is necessary under Employment Division v. Smith.189 The
respondents in Boerne further argued that Congress’ Section Five power was not
limited to remedial or preventive legislation, but was a positive grant of legislative
power to Congress.190 The Supreme Court agreed with the respondents that Congress
has the power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the
provisions of that Amendment, and that under that power Congress can enact
legislation enforcing the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion.191
The Supreme Court next stated, however, that Congress’ power under Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment extended only to enforcing the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment.192 The Court found the design of the Amendment and the
text of Section Five to be inconsistent with the idea that Congress has the power to
decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States.193
The Court stated:
Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot
be said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a
constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has been given the
power “to enforce,” not the power to determine what constitutes a
constitutional violation. Were it not so, what Congress would be
enforcing would no longer be, in any meaningful sense, the “provisions of
[the Fourteenth Amendment].”194
The Court noted the important distinction between Congressional measures
which remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a
187
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substantive change in the governing law.195 The Respondents contended that the
RFRA was a proper exercise of Congress’ remedial or preventive power.196 It
prevented and remedied laws which were enacted with the unconstitutional object of
targeting religious beliefs and practices.197 The Court found this argument
unconvincing, stating that although preventive rules are sometimes appropriate
remedial measures, there must be a congruence between the means used and the ends
to be achieved.198 The Court found this congruence lacking between the means and
the ends of the RFRA.199 The Court found the RFRA to be a substantive change in
constitutional protections rather than remedial or preventive legislation.200
Finally, the Supreme Court held that the RFRA’s attempt to redefine the standard
for judging constitutionally-protected religious freedoms as set forth in Employment
Division v. Smith was an unconstitutional attempt to use Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment to “control cases and controversies.”201 The Court held that
Congress’ power under Section Five did not authorize it to pass “general legislation
upon the rights of the citizens.”202 Furthermore, the Court held that Congress may
not define the meaning of the First Amendment’s “free exercise” clause, and may not
by general legislation impose its definition of free exercise on the States.203
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in City of Boerne v. Flores was criticized by
many.204 One commentator suggested that the Boerne opinion was “an almost
ungracious disparagement of the purposes and objectives of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act.”205 Supporters of the Boerne opinion argued that “RFRA tried to
turn the First Amendment on its head” by saying that the Fourteenth Amendment
gives Congress “a positive right” to protect free exercise of religion by “appropriate
legislation.”206 The Boerne decision drove Senators Orin Hatch and Ted Kennedy,
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and Representatives Charles Canady and Jerold Nadler to introduce new legislation
that would reinstate the “compelling state interest” test.207 This legislation came to
be known as the Religious Liberty Protection Act, and the constitutional
justifications for it were Congress’ spending power and the commerce clause.208
Like its predecessor, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Religious
Liberty Protection Act is a quite controversial piece of legislation. The spending
power reliance in the RLPA is sure to cause problems. The only way for a state or
local government to avoid RLPA’s mandate would be to forgo all federal financial
assistance. Under South Dakota v. Dole, this can be viewed as a “financial
inducement so coercive that it passes the point at which pressure turns into
compulsion.”209 Such an inducement was held unconstitutional in that case.210 The
RLPA gives states only two options: take federal funds with the RLPA liability, or
take no funds at all. These two options may easily be viewed as having reached the
point where pressure turns into compulsion. The commerce clause justification for
the RLPA is also flawed. United States v. Lopez211 precludes the RLPA’s reliance on
the commerce clause. The commerce clause is a poor way to justify religious
protection, as those religious practices with little or no commercial component would
not be protected.212 Furthermore, there will be many cases in which the effect on
commerce can’t be proven, and will fall outside of the RLPA protection.213
The Religious Liberty Protection Act also poses an Establishment Clause
problem. By protecting religions that affect commerce, and not protecting those
religions that do not, the RLPA is, in fact, an Establishment of religion. It favors one
religion over another. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Larson v. Valente, “the
clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination
cannot be officially preferred over another.”214 By protecting religions with a
commercial component, and not protecting religions with little or no commercial
component, the RLPA is “officially preferr[ing]” one denomination over another, in
violation of Larson v. Valente.215
Claims under the Religious Liberty Protection Act may be used to defeat civil
rights. Defendants in civil rights cases will likely be able to use religious free
exercise claims as a defense under the RLPA. Landlords may be exempt from fair
housing laws by claiming that their religious beliefs prohibit them from renting to
unmarried couples or homosexuals. The American Civil Liberties Union, an initial
207
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author of the Religious Liberty Protection Act, now opposes the bill unless an
amendment is added making it clear that religious claims may not be used to defeat
civil rights laws.216
In its last attempt to pass legislation to protect religion, Congress was overruled
by the Supreme Court. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the predecessor of
the Religious Liberty Protection Act, was Congress’ first attempt to protect religious
exercise.217 The RFRA was premised on different constitutional grounds than the
RLPA, but its goals were much the same.218 In 1997, the Supreme Court struck
down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in City of Boerne v. Flores.219 The
Religious Liberty Protection Act appears to be an attempt by Congress to pass almost
identical legislation using different constitutional grounds.
If it is passed by the Senate and signed into law by the President, the Religious
Liberty Protection Act is sure to face a Supreme Court challenge, just as the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act did. The RLPA is likely to create unintended
results, such as giving official preference to certain religions at the expense of others,
forcing states to forgo federal financial assistance, and adversely impacting the
enforcement of civil rights laws. The Religious Liberty Protection Act places a
heavy burden on governments, which are forced to prove a “compelling
governmental interest” for any act or measure that may be viewed as burdening
religion, even in the case of laws of general applicability. Furthermore, the RLPA
gives religions a legal tool to fight nearly every law that a state or local government
might pass. A possible solution to the problems sure to surface if the RLPA passes
the Senate and is signed into law is for Congress to focus on individual areas where
burdens on religious conduct exist, rather than passing sweeping legislation such as
the Religious Liberty Protection Act. As the RLPA stands now, a whole host of
challenges are likely to be brought should the legislation become law, including
challenges to the commerce and spending constitutional justifications for the bill. As
one constitutional scholar has noted of the RLPA, “This bill is an unvarnished
request from religious lobbyists to permit religious individuals and institutions to
break a wide variety of laws.”220
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